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Abstract
Many suggestions have beenmade onwhatmotivates countries to expand their measures for disaster risk reduction (DRR),
including the frequency and severity of natural hazards, accountability mechanisms, and governance capacity. Despite the
fact that theoretical arguments have been developed and evidence collected from small-scale case studies, few studies
have attempted to explain the substantial variation in the adoption of DRR measures across countries. This study com-
bines available data on DRR measures, natural hazard events, governance, and socioeconomic characteristics to provide a
systematic assessment of the changes that have occurred in the state of DRR at the national level. In line with theoretical
explanations, there are indeed associations between several measures of frequency and severity and the development
of DRR status. Additionally, voice and accountability mechanisms, as well as development aid, might facilitate positive
change. Although these first results of a global comparative study on change in DRR have to be taken cautiously, it is a step
forward to understanding the drivers of change at the national level.
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1. Introduction
Little is known about the way in which and the rea-
sons why national action on disaster risk reduction (DRR)
has changed globally. This is despite the acknowledge-
ment that a shift has occurred, towards more proactive
attention, in light of the two prominent UN-led frame-
works, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) and the
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction estab-
lished in 2005 and 2015, respectively. It is also despite
the increasing losses connected to natural hazards in
recent decades due to a rise in their frequency and sever-
ity (Di Baldassarre et al., 2018).
While several studies have investigated changes in
policy and adoption of DRR measures at the local
and sub-national level, data provided by the United
Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR, for-
merly United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction) enable such analysis of national action at the
global scale. We have recently explored the patterns of
progress under the HFA and expounded the progress
achieved (Wanner, 2020); however, as of yet, we have
not been able to empirically ascertain the factors that
drive progress towards a higher level of DRR globally.
Since such changes in DRR measures represent a form
of policy development, established theoretical models of
policy change, including incrementalism and punctuated
equilibrium theory, can be used to study potential expla-
nations in the field of DRR.
Thus, this study sets out to investigate the relation
between the changes in the national status of DRR mea-
sures under the HFA and the most prominent theories
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of policy change in an attempt to explain the substantial
variation across countries. Whereas the HFA covers all
kinds of hazards—technological and natural alike—this
study focuses specifically on the effect of natural haz-
ard events because of the aforementioned increase in
their frequency and impact over recent decades. To this
end, data on DRR measures, natural hazard events, and
governance are combined for a systematic assessment
of the change in the status of DRR measures at the
national level.
Consequentially, this article statistically tests the the-
oretical explanations for DRR policy change proposed by
previous literature. Potential explanations to be tested
include incremental changes and external shocks opera-
tionalised as the increasing frequency and severity of nat-
ural hazards over recent years, as well as the prospect
of politicization of hazard events. This study is the first
attempt of a global assessment of change in national
DRR, providing the opportunity to learn more about the
patterns of progress in DRR and contribute to the under-
standing of the evolution of DRR measures.
2. Drivers of Change in National Disaster Governance
By experiencing hazardous or disastrous events, author-
ities might learn how to adapt to and prepare for sim-
ilar occurrences in the future. They might incrementally
adopt newmeasures to adapt to changing circumstances
or introduce changes in response to specific, large-scale
events. In addition, the politicisation of the event and its
consequences might even facilitate or impede the devel-
opment of DRR measures. In the field of DRR and dis-
aster governance, we have not yet systematically inves-
tigated any of the potential explanations on a larger
scale, most likely because of the scarcity of appropriate
data. Below, we outline the predominant yet potentially
competing theoretical approaches that have been estab-
lished within research on policy change in the context of
crises and disasters.
On one side, incrementalists would argue that pol-
icy development and implementation is usually a process
whereby small changes gradually accumulate (Hayes,
2017; Lindblom, 1959; Pierson, 2000). In the case of
DRR, this idea is inherently connected to the idea of
adaptation to frequent or intensifying natural hazard
events. Most commonly, these hazards tend to re-occur
in the same area allowing stakeholders to learn, and
prepare for, potential future events. Thus, when haz-
ards frequently occur and only increase slightly in their
magnitude, rather incremental changes might be estab-
lished to adapt to the threat and minimise future losses
(Nohrstedt & Nyberg, 2015). Previous findings from stud-
ies on cases on the sub-national level and single haz-
ards suggest that hazard frequency and repetitive dam-
age play a significant role because of raised awareness or
growing pressures (Brody, 2003; Brody, Zahran, Highfield,
Bernhardt, & Vedlitz, 2009; Muller & Schulte, 2011;
Russell, James, & Bourque, 1995).
In stark contrast to incrementalism, the theory of
punctuated equilibrium argues that external shocks,
which fall outside the range of normal and expected dis-
turbances, drive changes in policy and measures that
are adopted (Baumgartner, Jones, & Wilkerson, 2002;
Jones & Baumgartner, 2012; Krasner, 1984). When haz-
ards turn into disasters due to large-scale human or cap-
ital losses, they represent external shocks or focusing
events disrupting the established system and potentially
leading to substantial change following a spike in atten-
tion and pressure to reform (Birkland, 2016; Dekker &
Hansén, 2004; Olson, 2000). Whether it is the number of
people killed and injured (Zahran, Brody, Vedlitz, Grover,
& Miller, 2008) or financial losses (Brody et al., 2009),
studies have identified that the potential of impacts of
hazards are drivers of change in local-level case studies.
Others have pointed out that frequent but low-impact
events can lead to adverse developments due to a ‘nor-
malization bias’ (Mileti & Brien, 1992) for non-victims.
Thus, natural hazards can be understood as drivers of
change in DRR measures from both perspectives, incre-
mentalism and punctuated equilibrium, or as a com-
bination or synthesis of them (Collier & Collier, 1991;
Stark, 2018). Both the frequency and severity of nat-
ural hazards may play a major role in the change in
the level of DRR measures. However, we need to con-
sider that continuing disturbances might act as hin-
drances by overburdening the governmental apparatus
since the system might be unable to handle the situa-
tion. Therefore, the governance capacity comprising gov-
ernance structures, coordination, human resources, and
the assignment of roles and mandates might be crucial
for determining whether the frequency of natural haz-
ards affects the national level of DRR measures (Koivisto
& Nohrstedt, 2017).
As mentioned before, hazard events tend to get
politicised very quickly in a political game of framing
and blaming, finger-pointing and assigning responsibility
(Boin, ‘t Hart, & McConnell, 2009; Olson, 2000). While
there is reason to assume that the windows of oppor-
tunity for change and reform are smaller than expected
due to barriers in crisis management (Boin & ‘t Hart,
2003, 2010), framing, agenda-setting, and accountabil-
ity mechanisms might also enable political action and
change—not only in government but also in policy imple-
mentation. To transpose Amartya Sen’s logic of famines
and democracy toDRR, the citizenry is unlikely to re-elect
or support officials who do not act to avoid or amelio-
rate future impacts (Sen, 2001). Because citizens transfer
responsibility to the authorities (Adger, Quinn, Lorenzoni,
Murphy, & Sweeney, 2013), these mechanisms ensure
that politicians acting against the interest of the citizens
will have to leave office. Accordingly, when many people
are affected by natural hazards and are in favour of more
expansive DRR measures, authorities would be more
likely to opt to increase DRR measures. A recent study
on the reduction of nuclear power after the Fukushima
meltdowns supports the positive impact of civil liberty
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rights and accountability mechanisms on policy change
after a disaster (Aldrich, Forester, & Horhager, 2019).
In sum, the study of change in the national status of
DRRmeasures will focus on three potential explanations:
incremental change, external shocks, and accountability
mechanisms. Consequentially, the analysis will explore
the relations of adopted DRR measures, the frequency
and magnitude of natural hazards, and governance char-
acteristics. Thereby, it is expected that all of these might
facilitate the expansion of DRRmeasures to some extent.
3. Data and Research Methodology
3.1. Dependent Variable
Change is central since the status of DRR measures does
not provide any information about what led to the actual
measures at specific points in time. Hence, the empir-
ical evaluation focuses on the change in the status of
national DRR measures from one period to the next in
the attempt to find explanations for the differences in
change between countries.
The data for the dependent variable comes from
PreventionWeb, a website hosted and managed by the
UNDRR (formerly United Nations International Strategy
for Disaster Reduction), which was in charge of the HFA
and collected the national reports (UNDRR, n.d.). The
UN framework ran between 2005 and 2015 with its ulti-
mate goal being to substantially reduce disaster losses by
2015 (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster
Reduction, 2005). The data are based on voluntary coun-
try reports on the status of DRRmeasures and comprises
22 key activities sorted into five priorities for action (see
the Supplementary File for full list). The status is mea-
sured on an ordinal five-point scale spanning the follow-
ing categories: (1)minor progresswith few signs of action
in planning or policy; (2) some progress, but without sys-
tematic policy and/or institutional commitment; (3) insti-
tutional commitment attained, but achievements being
neither comprehensive nor substantial; (4) substantial
achievement attained but with recognized limitations in
key aspects, such as financial resources and/or opera-
tional capacities; and (5) comprehensive achievement
with sustained commitment and capacities at all levels.
The reports further include qualitative and quanti-
tative questions on the key activities that informed the
categorisation. Although the categories are described in
terms of progress, this is rather misleading since they
rather capture the status of DRR measures at one point
in time without integrating the change in respect to pre-
vious periods.
The unit of analysis of this study is country-reporting
period, ideally, resulting in four observations per coun-
try. The change in the status of DRR measures is then
the averaged net change in the 22 key activities from
one reporting period to the next. For this, the analy-
sis interprets the ordinal scale as quasi-interval only for
the purpose of summarising the status of DRR measures.
Because distances on the scale remain opaque and unin-
terpretable between countries, the scale of the depen-
dent variable is again turned into an ordinal scale differ-
entiating categories by the direction and magnitude of
change, since the additional information created is not
reliable across countries. Due to the distribution of obser-
vations, the categories were created representing nega-
tive, negligible, and positive change. Thereby, the thresh-
olds were set at one standard deviation of the mean.


















Figure 1. Distribution into 3 categories after collapsing (Stata).






























Figure 2. Change in aggregated scores for each country from one period to the next. Notes: Dashed line=maximal positive
change possible. Solid line = no change reference line (Stata).
gories and the empirical data on changes in the status
of DRR measures.
Considering the scale of the dependent variable,
ordered logit models are employed given the quality of
the information in order to obtain meaningful results
(Long & Freese, 2014). In particular, generalised ordered
logit models were used because of the theoretically
expected asymmetrical effects and—by the Brant test—
empirically detected violations of the assumption of par-
allel lines or proportional odds (Brant, 2016; Fullerton
& Dixon, 2010; Williams, 2016). Therefore, the Stata
program gologit2 provided by Williams (2006, 2016) is
utilised, which enables one to relax the assumption of
parallel lines. This means that the effects of some or all
predictors are allowed to vary depending on the value or
category of the dependent variable. For instance, for the
effect of the number of occurrences, it may make a dif-
ference whether a country falls into the negative or posi-
tive category. This allows one to potentially make obser-
vations such as higher levels of occurrence can hamper
progress if a country is in the negative change category,
but facilitate progress if a country is in a higher category.
Results have to be handled with caution since the
analysis might be distorted because of state-dependent
reporting biases or reporting heterogeneity, i.e., that
countries differently interpret the thresholds or cut-
off points on the ordinal scale measuring the level of
the DRR activities (Lindeboom & Van Doorslaer, 2004),
“making policy recommendations unreliable” (Schneider,
Pfarr, Schneider, & Ulrich, 2012, p. 251). Since observa-
tions are considered independent across countries and
to account for dependencies within countries, clustered
standard errors are always used.
3.2. Explanatory Variables (Predictors)
In order to capture the possible relationships between
the change in the status of DRR measures and poten-
tial explanations, the HFA data are matched with several
other datasets. The predictors are based on the poten-
tial drivers of change suggested by previous research.
The theoretical ideas of incrementalism, punctuated
equilibrium, and politicisation are operationalised in
predictors comprising different measures of the fre-
quency and severity of natural hazards as well as gover-
nance characteristics.
Data on the frequency and severity of natural hazards
are taken from the Emergency Event Database (EM-DAT),
which is the International Disaster Database provided by
the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters
hosted at the Université Catholique de Louvain. Since
it is indeed a global database with country-level data
on natural and technological disasters “containing…data
on the occurrence and effects of…disasters in the world,
from 1900 to present” (Centre for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters, 2009), only natural hazards
according to their disaster group are considered with
the exclusion of biological hazards. As mentioned before,
natural hazards are in the spotlight of this analysis due
to their increasing frequency, intensifying circumstances,
and rising losses (Di Baldassarre et al., 2018). As there
are alternative approaches to measuring the frequency
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and severity, this study considers the pure number of
occurrences as the measure of frequency. It should be
mentioned that EM-DAT only includes events that fulfil
at least one of the following criteria: 10 or more peo-
ple dead, 100 or more people affected, declaration of a
state of emergency, or a call for international assistance
(Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters,
2009). As such, neither small-scale events nor large-scale
eventswith only financial damage are covered. Following
the logic presented before, the interaction with gover-
nance capacity will be included in the analysis, because
this capacity may indicate whether the authorities were
overburdened by the situation. Thus, it would be an indi-
cation for incremental change, if there is a positive asso-
ciation between (1) the interaction of recent occurrences
and government capacity and (2) DRR status being in the
positive change category.
Concerning the severity, the statistical analysis
includes several measures, namely financial damage,
death toll and the number of people affected, since
either of them is sufficient for an event being classified
as a shock. They are all put in relation to historical mea-
surements over the 20 years before the HFA to detect
uncommon spikes, representing extraordinary shocks to
the system.
The number of the affectedwas also put in relation to
the total population and, then, interacted with the index
of voice and accountability. This represents the politiciza-
tion of hazardous events in line with Sen’s logic. The rea-
soning is that the larger the proportion of the population
affected and the more rights citizens have to voice their
opinion and hold authorities responsible, the more likely
it is that there will be a positive change.
The data on government capacity, accountability
mechanisms, and education stems from the World Bank
but was taken from the Quality of Governance Standard
Data (QOG) provided by the Quality of Government
Institute at the University of Gothenburg. This data is
a collection of national data on governance and gov-
ernments from more than 100 data sources (Teorell
et al., 2020b). The analysis in the article includes the
index of Voice and Accountability (wbgi_vae) because it
best reflects “the extent to which citizens of a country
are able to participate in the selection of governments”
(Teorell et al., 2020a, p. 619), as well as the index of
Governance Effectiveness (wbgi_gee) as a measure of
governance capacity.
3.3. Control
In addition to the predictors, there is a need to include
several controls that might have an impact on the depen-
dent variable. First, a lagged variable as a control cap-
turing the previous level of DRR measures has to be
introduced. This is necessary since it substantially affects
the possibility for change in the next period because
of the rigid ordinal five-point scale of the HFA. Second,
historical data on death tolls, financial damage, and
number of people affected were included to control for
historical effects and the hazard history of the coun-
try. Multicollinearity was detected between recent and
historical data; however, since they account for dif-
ferent explanations, they were not excluded (see the
Supplementary File for correlation table).
Third, total official development aid (ODA) was
included as a control to account for financial capaci-
ties. Additionally, a measure of relational ODA (ODA in
the period in relation to the average of the previous
three years) was added to account for spikes or drops
in aid. Fourth, a control was added for the number of
reports submitted by a country, since engaged coun-
tries might follow the HFA guidelines more thoroughly.
This is related to theories on the diffusion of knowledge
and best practices, which was facilitated by the arenas
established by the UN frameworks. Fifth, controls for
education were included on primary and secondary lev-
els. Lastly, measures of the state of development, i.e.,
GDP/cap, were excluded since strong collinearity with
the governance indices was detected. Table 1 below pro-
vides the summary statistics, sources, and linked theoret-
ical perspectives of the various variables.
4. Results
This section presents the results in the following subsec-
tions. First, the statistical analysis of the HFA starting val-
ues is presented. Second, the relationship between the
change in the status of DRR measures and the potential
drivers are explored for three categories of change (neg-
ative, negligible, positive).
4.1. HFA Starting Values
A linear ordinary least square regression was conducted
to check correlations and potential explanations for the
starting values within the HFA. This was necessary to
reveal biases in the data, i.e., conditions that led to
higher starting values in a subset of countries.
As the results of four different models in Table 2
show, only country characteristics seem relevant for the
national starting values. Government effectiveness or
the level of development, which correlate, contribute
to a higher starting value of the status of DRR mea-
sures. Thus, developing countries started at lower val-
ues than industrialised countries—everything else being
equal. The results further indicate that countries with
higher wealth and secondary school enrolment rates
are more likely to be associated with a higher status
of DRR measures when countries began their reporting.
ODA is indeed another factor that is positively related
to the starting value, but the effect is only marginal.
Surprisingly, measures of historic hazard characteristics
are throughout not relevant for the status of DRR mea-
sures at the inception of the HFA. In conclusion, it seems
that DRR is another development issue. High starting
values are more prevalent in more developed countries,
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Table 1. Summary statistics.
Variables Theoretical concept Source Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max
Previous Status (lag1) Mediating factor UNDRR 174 3.336 0.625 1.318 4.684
Occurrence Incrementalism EM-DAT 148 9.074 12.01 1 76
Deaths (rel.) Shock EM-DAT 146 0.477 1.413 0 9.737
Damage (rel.) Shock EM-DAT 139 1.069 4.704 0 44.23
Affected (rel./pop) Shock EM-DAT 146 0.067 0.213 0 2.219
Occurrences (historical) Incrementalism EM-DAT 174 46.49 69.29 1 490
Deaths (hist.) (ts.) Incrementalism EM-DAT 174 11.62 34.69 0 183.1
Damage (hist) (bil. US$) Incrementalism EM-DAT 174 12.38 50.94 0 436.9
Affected (hist.) (mil.) Incrementalism EM-DAT 174 29.61 162.8 0 1235
School Enrol. Control QOG/World Bank 148 103.8 10.45 69.79 142.2
(primary) (%)
School Enrol. Control QOG/World Bank 135 84.20 26.18 18.66 146.4
(secondary) (%)
Governance Mediating factor QOG/World Bank 168 0.184 0.908 −1.44 2.220
Effectiveness
Voice & Accountability Accountability QOG/World Bank 168 0.209 0.862 −1.70 1.728
GDP/capita (ts. US$) Control QOG/World Bank 167 15.72 21.53 0.226 100.8
ODA Development Control OECD 174 590.0 908.1 −415.91 4676
Aid (ODA)
ODA (rel.) Control OECD 174 0.666 2.365 −28.299 5.809
Total # reports submitted Control UNDRR 180 3.247 0.723 2 4
by country
Table 2. Results of the OLS regressions for the HFA starting value.
Variables HFA_av HFA_av HFA_av
Occurrences 0.003 −0.000 −0.000
(hist.) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Deaths (hist.) −0.002 −0.000 0.000
(thousands) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Damage (hist.) −0.000 0.001 0.001
(billion US$) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002)
Affected (hist.) −0.000 0.000 0.000
(million) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
School enrolment −0.012* −0.011*
Primary (0.006) (0.006)










Constant 3.010*** 3.181*** 3.282 ∗ ∗∗
(0.092) (0.653) (0.634)
Observations 111 79 80
R-squared (r2) 0.052 0.470 0.468
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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most likely because they had the financialmeans to intro-
duce DRR measures in the past.
4.2. Change in the Status of DRR Measures
To analyse the relationship between changes in HFA
scores, i.e., DRR measures, and potential explana-
tions, first, an ordered logistic regression (ologit) was
employed, which revealed several relationships (Table 3).
A goodness of fit measure, Count r2, and adjusted
Count r2 were employed, since they fit the data and
analysis best. Thereby, the Count r2 states how often
the correct outcome would be predicted. In addition,
the adjusted Count r2 is not adjusted to the number of
predictors but accounts for the most likely guess, i.e.,
a country would show no change. Thus, it states how
much the guess improves because of the model—in con-
trast to the most likely guess (Williams, 2020). The mod-
els improve the correct guess by 25 to 33.3 percentage
points (Table 3).
Count r2 = Number correctly classified











4.2.1. Ordered Logistic Regression Models (ologit)
As anticipated, the previous status is indeed negatively
correlated with the likelihood for a country to be in a
higher category. Countries that already score high are
less likely to show progress than those that do not. The
same negative relationship is identified for the number
of occurrences in relation to government effectiveness.
This means that the more frequent hazards occur in rela-
tion to the government’s capacity, the more likely it is
that a country will show negative development or no
change in their DRR measures. This supports the idea
that reoccurring events hinder the adoption of further
measures, potentially leading to a collapse of the sys-
tem. Moreover, there seems to be a negative associa-
tion with the relational death tolls as well. That would
mean that the higher the spike in deaths, the less likely
it is that a country would be in a higher category. This
is counterintuitive since one would expect that coun-
tries which experienced an event with a high death toll
would rather introduce DRRmeasures to provide greater
protection for their citizens. On the other hand, high
death tolls might indicate extreme disruption that over-
burdened the system. The strongest positive association
can be found between being in a higher category and the
proportion of the population affected in interaction with
the rights to participate in government selection. This
finding is in line with the expectation that if large parts of
the population are affected and have the opportunity to
voice their views and vote, governments are more likely
to introducemore advancedDRRmeasures. Positive rela-
tionships can also be identified for both historical dam-
age and development aid, suggesting that countries try
to prevent future financial losses if they have already
experienced such losses. At the same time, ODA might
be used for improving the level of DRR measures.
To check and ensure the relevance and significance of
the results, we tested for violations of the parallel lines or
proportional odds assumption (see the Supplementary
File for Brant test results). The Brant test investigates
whether the effects of the predictors are the same when
the country falls into different categories of change. For
instance, predictors may show a negative relationship
when countries are in the negative change category, but
positive if not. Although the test is overall insignificant,
the Brant tests of each predictor provide evidence that
the assumption that predictors are the same across cat-
egories of the dependent variable was violated. In par-
ticular, when the control on the number of reports
is excluded, several predictors are below or too close
to the significance threshold to discard the possibility.
Indeed, several coefficients for predictors revealed not
only changes in strength but also in direction.
Consequentially, the ologit results might not repre-
sent the true relationships between the predictors and
the dependent variable. Therefore, in a next step, uncon-
strained and partially constrained generalised ordered
logit (gologit) models were utilised.
4.2.2. Generalised Ordered Logistic Regression Models
(gologit)
The gologit models relax the assumption of parallel
lines for specific variables, allowing them to vary across
categories of the dependent variable (as explained in
Section 3.1). Table 4 details the results of the gologit
models. While the assumption is relaxed for the three
predictors suggested by the Brant test, the adjusted
count r2 increases and the information criteria (AIC/BIC)
decrease, suggesting an increase in model fit. More
unconstrained models were run in comparison and are
less parsimonious according to the information criteria,
although the proportion of correct guesses increases fur-
ther. Consequentially, the partially constrainedmodel (1)
was chosen for interpreting the results.
Looking at the results, several significant relation-
ships can be uncovered. First, the previous status is still
highly influential regarding the likelihood that a country
does not display positive change. A slightly higher previ-
ous status drastically decreases the chance to be in the
positive-change category. As mentioned before, this is
in line with our expectations and reflects the diminish-
ing possibilities for strengthening DRR measures when
they are already at a high level. As the investigation of
the starting value revealed, development state of coun-
tries is crucial for the starting value and, thus, the previ-
ous status. The effect of the previous status is, however,
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Table 3. Results from the ologit regressions for the change in the status of DRR measures.
Ordered logit models
Variables With/without no. of reports




Government effectiveness 1.208 1.179
(0.771) (0.774)
Occ. # Gov. Eff. −0.126** −0.115**
(0.058) (0.054)
Deaths (relational) −0.419 −0.542**
(0.265) (0.239)
Damage (relational) 0.041 0.100
(0.145) (0.131)
Affected (rel. population) 11.829** 9.955**
(4.658) (4.223)
Voice & Accountabilty 0.025 0.071
(0.720) (0.674)
Affec. (rel.pop.) # V&A 9.698* 10.427**
(5.336) (4.911)
Occurrences (hist.) −0.012 −0.013
(0.011) (0.011)
Deaths (hist.) (ts.) −0.004 −0.000
(0.014) (0.013)
Damage (hist.) (billion US$) 0.029*** 0.027***
(0.008) (0.008)
Affec. (hist.) (million) −0.002 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
School enrolment Primary −0.006 −0.008
(0.027) (0.028)




ODA (relational) −0.133** −1.01**
(0.060) (0.050)
3 reports submitted −0.948
(0.777)







Log pseudolikelihood it. 0 −107.2 −107.2
Log pseudolikelihood −81.71 −82.99
Clusters 64 64
Count r2 0.696 0.661
Adjusted Count r2 0.333 0.255
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the county level in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 4. Results from the generalised ordered logit (gologit) regression models.
Partially constrained (1) Partially constrained (2) Unconstrained gologit
Unconstrained: Occ; death_rel; occ_hist All hazard predictors All predictors
Variable Coeff. Marg. Eff. Coeff. Marg. Eff. Coeff. Marg. Eff.
Previous Status
Negative −2.729*** 0.021 −2.939*** 0.000 −1.470* 0.000
Negligible −2.729*** 0.651*** −2.939*** 0.452 −3.596*** 0.659*
Positive −0.673*** −0.452 −0.659*
Occurrences
Negative 0.243 −0.001 0.254 −0.000 0.328* −0.000
Negligible −0.021 0.021 −0.073 0.024 −0.110 0.030
Positive −0.019 −0.024 −0.030
Governance Eff.
Negative 1.518* 0.005 1.711** 0.000 2.596* 0.000
Negligible 1.518* 0.005 1.711** 0.000 2.596* 0.000
Positive −0.154 −0.215 −0.249
Occurrences # Gov. Eff.
Negative −0.225*** −0.179 −0.323
Negligible −0.225*** −0.326*** −0.216**
Deaths (rel.)
Negative 2.248 −0.017 1.705 −0.000 2.325 −0.000
Negligible −1.501*** 0.387*** −1.903*** 0.293* −1.946*** 0.356
Positive −0.370*** −0.293* −0.356**
Damage (rel.)
Negative 0.047*** −0.000 0.100* −0.000 0.147 −0.000
Negligible 0.342* −0.082* 0.482** −0.074 0.525* −0.096
Positive 0.084* 0.074 0.096*
Affected (rel. pop.)
Negative 11.183*** −0.112 18.595* −0.000 23.692 −0.000
Negligible 11.183*** −3.437** 8.094 −1.737 8.952* −2.188
Positive 3.549** 1.738 2.188
Voice & Accountability
Negative 0.070 −0.006 0.161 −0.000 −0.134 −0.000
Negligible 0.070 −0.174 0.147 −0.123 0.763 −0.252
Positive 0.180 0.123 0.252
Affec. (re.) # V&A
Negative 11.020** 15.153 25.647
Negligible 11.020** 10.966* 10.258*
Occurrences (hist.)
Negative −0.027 0.000 −0.063* 0.000 −0.086** 0.000
Negligible −0.006 0.001 0.020 −0.003 0.017 −0.003
Positive −0.002 0.003 0.003
Deaths (hist.) (ts.)
Negative −0.001 0.000 −0.009 0.000 0.015 −0.000
Negligible −0.001 0.000 −0.016 0.002 −0.003 0.001
Positive −0.000 −0.002 −0.001
Damage (hist.) (bill. US$)
Negative 0.047*** −0.000 0.100* −0.000 0.147 −0.000
Negligible 0.047*** −0.011*** −0.004 0.001 −0.010 0.002
Positive 0.011*** −0.001 −0.002
School enrolment primary
Negative −0.012 0.000 −0.034 0.000 −0.198** 0.000
Negligible −0.012 0.003 −0.034 0.005 −0.001 0.000
Positive −0.003 −0.005 −0.000
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Table 4. (Cont.) Results from the generalised ordered logit (gologit) regression models.
Partially constrained (1) Partially constrained (2) Unconstrained gologit
Unconstrained: Occ; death_rel; occ_hist All hazard predictors All predictors
Variable Coeff. Marg. Eff. Coeff. Marg. Eff. Coeff. Marg. Eff.
School enrolment secondary
Negative 0.031 −0.000 0.045** −0.000 0.058 −0.000
Negligible 0.031 −0.007 0.045** −0.007 0.051* −0.009
Positive 0.008 0.007 0.009
ODA
Negative 0.001** −0.000 0.001* −0.000 0.001 −0.000
Negligible 0.001** −0.000* 0.001* −0.000 0.001** −0.000
Positive 0.000** 0.000 0.000
ODA (rel.)
Negative −0.148** 0.001 −0.148** 0.000 0.989 −0.000
Negligible −0.148** 0.035** −0.148** 0.023 −0.154** 0.028*
Positive −0.036** −0.023 −0.028*
# of reports: 2
Negative 0.046 0.094 −1.140
Negligible 0.046 −0.491 −0.323
# of reports: 3
Negative −0.962 −0.914 −0.487
Negligible −0.962 −0.910 −1.241
# of reports: 4 (omitted) (omitted) (omitted)
Constant
Negative 8.881** 10.813*** 20.731***
Negligible 6.650 8.327** 6.944*
Observations 112 112 112 112 112 112
Clusters 64 64 64 64 64 64
Pseudo Log-Likelihood: Iteration 0 −107.2 −107.2 −107.2 −107.2 −107.2 −107.2
Pseudo Log-Likelihood −74.51 −74.51 −68.95 −68.95 −63.88 −63.88
r2 0.305 0.305 0.357 0.357 0.404 0.404
Count r2 0,696 0,75 0,75
Adjusted Count r2 0,333 0,451 0,451
AIC 197 206 208
AIC/N 1,759 1,838 1,855
BIC 262 298 317
Notes: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
insignificant when the country falls into the negative
change category. For experiencing a decrease in the sta-
tus of DRR measures, it does not seem to matter how
high the previous status was.
Second, governance effectiveness can enhance the
probability to be in a higher category, but the effect is
diminished as hazardous events become more frequent.
This supports the theory that frequent hazard events
can overburden the governmental apparatus, potentially
leading to a collapse of the system. Vice versa, an effec-
tive government might compensate for and offset infre-
quent small-scale occurrences. Thus, changes in DRR
measures are likely to be adopted for a low number of
recurring occurrences. Unfortunately, the analysis is not
able to confirm whether these are incremental changes
or due to shocks.
Third, and most interestingly, there seems to be a
strong positive association in the interaction of the num-
ber of people affected and the voice and accountability
mechanismswhich exist in the country. This effect would,
in fact, confirm Sen’s logic in disaster studies and support
the findings of Aldrich et al. (2019) that the affected pop-
ulation assign responsibility for the damage caused by
hazardous events to the incumbent government. Thus, in
a country with higher levels of civil liberties and political
rights and some degree of independent media as a moni-
tor of government, politicians adoptmore DRRmeasures
to placate their voters, leading to a positive development
in national DRR, following extreme hazard events that
affected large proportions of the population. Accordingly,
the larger the proportion of the population affected, the
stronger the effect is likely to be.
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Fourth, spikes in death tolls seem to have a negative
association with a country being in the positive-change
category. Since spikes in death tolls indicate devastat-
ing events disrupting the system, these events not only
seem to affect the country adversely but also inhibit pos-
itive change. In contrast, extraordinary levels of damage
caused by hazards seem to be conducive for a country to
introduce positive change in their DRR measures. Thus,
countries may have reacted to extreme financial losses
by increasing their DRR measures. This finding might be
interesting for the argument that death tolls and dam-
age are not interchangeable measures of severity since
they have dissimilar effects. For the theory of external
shocks, financial losses seem to be more conducive to
positive change than human losses. One caveat to be
mentioned is that, since reporting periods span several
years, it is impossible to say whether the improvements
occurred in preparation before—and were futile—or if
they were a reaction to a particular disaster. Before rely-
ing on this finding, in-depth cases studies should investi-
gate these occurrences and establish the temporal con-
nection between events and change in DRR measures.
Fifth, experiences of damage in the past further
increase the likelihood of a country being in a higher
category. One explanation for this could be that such
countries would have had a lower status of DRR mea-
sures in the past, but now are incentivised to establish
more measures. Reasons for this should be investigated
further. Lastly, more development aid is likewise associ-
ated with a higher likelihood of being in a higher cate-
gory, indicating that aid is indeed helpful for countries to
advance their DRR measures and, thus, their prepared-
ness. However,marginal effects are considerably low sug-
gesting that large sums are necessary to spur this trend.
The relational ODA confirms that rises in development
aid are rather associated with being in lower categories.
This might be because countries that have to rely more
on development aid than in the past are occupied with
different issues or are, in fact, recovering from some
kind of disaster. In contrast, if reliance on aid were able
to be reduced, this would probably be due to either
the country having advanced over the last three years
and no longer needing the same amount of aid whilst
also improving its DRR measures, or alternatively, due to
the country having recovered from a disaster during the
reporting period.
To confirm the findings with robustness checks, the
models were also run as multinomial logit (mlogit), ordi-
nal generalised linear (oglm), OLS regressions models
with ordinal dependent variable. The main findings do
not change, and effects are confirmed across themodels.
5. Conclusions
This study marks an empirical attempt to explain the
changes in the national status of DRR measures on a
global scale with prominent theories of policy change.
It utilises data from theHFAon the four reporting periods
between 2005 and 2015 and combines itwith data on dis-
asters from EM-DAT and governance retrieved from the
Quality of Governance dataset.
First, a brief investigation revealed that high starting
values of DRR measures are correlated with higher lev-
els of wealth and development. Then, controlling for the
bias of a high previous status, generalised ordered logit
models were utilised to test the theoretical hypotheses
andwere checked by a battery of differentmodels. In line
with theoretical explanations, the findings indicate rela-
tionships between several predictors and the change in a
country’s DRRmeasures. There is a positive effect of gov-
ernment effectiveness, which is offset by frequent natu-
ral hazard events.While extraordinary damage facilitates
positive change, extremely deadly events are surpris-
ingly associated with little positive change. Furthermore,
the larger the proportion of the population affected,
the more likely it is that positive change is introduced.
This effect is even supported by voice and accountabil-
ity mechanisms which promote the adoption of more
expansive DRR measures. In addition, development aid
can also be conducive for facilitating positive change.
This study found support for all three employed the-
oretical perspectives on policy change. In the case of
DRR, incremental change may be adopted if hazards
occur frequently and if authorities are not overburdened.
External shocks in terms of damage and the proportion
of the population affected seem to spur positive change.
Even accountability mechanisms are helpful for positive
change in the status of DRR measures.
However, there are some limitations to this study
offering avenues for future research. First, the results
have been limited to the available self-reported data on
DRR measures. Thereby, the focus was on natural haz-
ards and their impact. Future research could empha-
sise biological or technological hazards or integrate the
various hazard types. Looking at the Sendai Framework
as the successor of the HFA, Cutter and Gall (2015)
expressed concerns about the indicators even at its
inception. Issues identified included insufficientmonitor-
ing, the availability of reliable loss data, and the under-
standing of the socioeconomic impacts, let alone the
ambiguity of baselines (Cutter &Gall, 2015). Even a quick
glance at the Sendai Framework Monitor (UNDRR, 2019)
confirms the need for caution since, as yet, there are too
few national submissions to conduct large-n analyses.
Second, there are other theoretical explanations,
which have not been included in this analysis, yet pro-
vide distinct opportunities for future research. Future
studies should try to integrate the effects of learning
and knowledge diffusion to a larger extent. Spillover
effects are capable of transporting experience and knowl-
edge across national borders, and, thus, can lead to pol-
icy transfer and diffusion of policy innovation without
an actual event (Aldrich et al., 2019; Benson & Jordan,
2011; Berry & Berry, 1990; Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett,
2007; Dolowitz &Marsh, 2000; Tosun & Croissant, 2016).
Globalised mass media might yet be another facilitat-
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ing factor transporting impacts from the event loca-
tion to other parts of the world (Wittneben, 2012),
although geographical proximity might strengthen the
effect (Nohrstedt & Weible, 2010). In addition, a care-
ful look at policy processes unfolding between the event
occurrence and policy change might further contribute
greatly to future research findings. This could include
aspects such as policy entrepreneurship and advocacy
coalitions (Mintrom & Norman, 2009; Nohrstedt &
Weible, 2010; Rhodes & ‘t Hart, 2014; Shipan & Volden,
2008) in the analysis of policy change in DRR.
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